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ABSTRACT 
This  paper argues that  a price wedge treatment  of 
agricultural surports can seriously misrepresent their  welfare 
and quantity effects.  We make our point by focusing on pre-1985 
US wheat programs, but  features of programs in many other 
countries lead to comparable problems with the ad valorem 
approach.  This  line of argument raises questions over  the 
current approach in the multilateral trade negotiations  of 
negotiating on producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs)  or some other 
subsidy-like measure. 
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Numerical  models of the effects  of domestic  agricultural  support 
programs usually  treat them as subsidizing  production,  in effect  introducing  a 
series of ad  valorem distortions or price "wedges" between  foreign and 
domestic prices.2 The  purpose  of this  paper  is to argue  that  a price wedge 
treatment  of  agricultural supports  can seriously misrepresent  their welfare 
and quantity  effects.  We make  our point by focusing  on  pre—1985 US wheat 
programs3,  but features of  programs  in many  other  countries  lead to comparable 
problems with  the ad  valorem approach.4  This  line  of argument  raises 
questions  over the current approach  in the multilateral  trade  negotiations  of 
negotiating  on producer  subsidy equivalents  (PSEs), or some other subsidy—like 
measure. 
The essence of the argument  in the US  wheat case is  that since cossnodity 
programs  are voluntary,  producers  who receive deficiency  payments must  also 
comply  with acreage limitations.  Farms who are already  participating  in 
support programs  will increase output  if price supports  increase.  But at the 
same tine,  previously  non—participating  farms will  be encouraged  to enter the 
program  if price  supports increase,  and they  will  set aside land  which was 
previously  in use.  Thus, rather than  simply subsidizing  output, the program 
as a whole nay have  production  incentive  or  disincentive  effects, depending  on 
the relative strength of the price effects  for farms  already participating, 
and the land  set—aside  effects for new program participants. 
It is, therefore, misleading  to represent these  programs  as  equivalent 
to an ad valorem  subsidy which  unambiguously  increases  output, as is done  in 
price wedge models.  The welfare  costs of  support programs will  be  mismeasured 
by an approach  using  an ad valorem  treatment,  since  the resources  idled as a 2 
result of  the set—asides  are not explicitly  modelled.  Whet is needed  to 
capture the effects of programs on output and welfare  is to  explicitly  model 
the program participation  decision of fames. 
Generating  unambiguous  analytical  results from  models  with set—asides 
and endogenous  participation  decisions  is something  that the existing 
literature has been unable to  do.  Coyle et  al. (1985)  calculate  the costs of 
set-asides,  but use exogenoualy  specified o  Jcipation responaes.  De  Coerter 
(1986) also analyzes the effects of  set—asides,  demonstrating  that  there are 
no simple qualitative  analytical  results,  Nowhere,  to our !mowledge.  are the 
marginal effects of these prograrmees  and the iccplicacions for output  and 
welfare folly disoussed. 
We  use a numerical  general equilibrium model0  in  which set—asides  are 
explicitly modelled,  along with  endogenous  participation  decisions  of farms. 
We use data  for 1981 to which  we  calibrate  the model,  This allows ua to 
analyze the joint  impact of US price  supports and set—aaidea  on US  wheat 
output, and calculate  the social coat  of  these programs. 
Our numerical  results show,  in contraat to what ia predicted  by 
conventional price wedge models,  that  removing price  aupporta for wheat  given 
1981 program characteristics  reduces rather  than increases  output, because of 
the impact on  participation  decisions  and aasociated  set aaidea.  Comparing 
our welfare evaluations  of  the aociai  cost of program  supports to those 
obtained using  the same  data  in a traditional  "price wedge"  model,  shows that 
resuits are sharply different. II.  US  Wheat  Programs and Program  Participation 
Supports  for producers  of wheat (as well as  corn,  grain sorghum, oats. 
barley, and rye) in  the US are largely provided through  Commodity Loans  and 
deficiency  payments.  These jointly have  the effect of  raising prices  received 
by  farmers. 
Under  the Commodity Loan rogra1n, the Commodity  Credit  Corporation 
6 
(CCC)  makes  non—recourse  loans to farmers using commodities  (wheat) as 
security,  stored either  on the farm  or in  commercial  warehouses.  These  loans 
nature  on  demand, but on or before  the loan's maturity  date  farmers have the 
option of  regaining  possession  of their crop  by paying  off the loan plus any 
accrued interest, or  forfeiting  the farm  or  warehouse—stored  commodities to 
the CCC as full payment of the loan.  This component  of price supports 
effectively  operates  through the setting of  the loan  rate. 
Deficiency  payments are based  on  the difference  between  the target price 
and the higher  of the national  average market  price and the loan  rate.  This 
difference  is multiplied  by the established  yield  of each  farmer's land  to 
determine  his total deficiency  payment.  Prior  to  1985 established yields  were 
typically  re—calculated  using a five—year  moving average  of preceding  years 
yields on  a farm—by—farm basis.  Under this  system, subject to a lag, higher 
yields  imply higher  deficiency  payments.  In effect, marginal  output  receives 
the support  (target) price.  One of the major  changes  in the 1985 Farm  Bill is 
the attempt to 'decouple' deficiency  payments from 
output by fixing established  yields. 
Acreage set asides coexist with  these  two methods  of price  support as a 
condition  for any farm  receiving  support.  To receive  deficiency  payments on 
their harvested  acreage, or to gain  access  to non—recourse  loans,  farmers are 4 
required to reduce their planted  acreage by a specified  percentage  of their 
base  acreage. 
The aim of  these set—aside  requirements is  to reduce  surpLus production 
thought to  be  generated by the price  supports!  However,  the joint effect  of 
deficiency payments,  loans, and set—esides on output Is uncertain,  Producerr 
participating  in  the program  plant a reduced scrnsge  but face  a higher price, 
giving  ambiguous effects on production.  Incr>ssing the target price  will 
increase  yields of progrsm  participants,  but  msy  also  increase partiripetion 
reducing planted screege.  To assess the net effect, it is necessary  co 
analyse  farm participation  decisions. 
To  decide  whether or not to participate  In  support  progrsms, individual 
fans conare  their profits from  participating  in both the price  support  end 
set—aside programs  with their profits if they do not participate.  Thus,  if Li 
represents the lend  available to farm 1,  PW the free market price of 
w 
wheat, P  the target price  of  wheat designated  under price  supports,  pZ 
T 
the price of  non—land  inputs used  by  all farms and X the set—aside rate;  the 
participation  decision for fan  i involves the comparison  of the profit 
N  P 
functions a  ,  a  for fan  i under  participation  (P) and non—participation  I  I 
(N). 
If, for farm  I, 
Nw  z  P  w  z 
1' (P  ,P )  a  a  (P  ,  P  ,  X)  (1)  I  I  1' 
then  farm  i will chose not to participate  in the set—aside  program, and will 
only  participate  if the inequality  is reversed. 5 
Farms differ  in a range  of  characteristics,  including the crop in  which 
farms have a comparative  advantage,  land quality, and the ease with  which  land 
and other  inputs can be substituted.  Typically,  for any given  levels of 
target  and market prices  and set—aside  rates,  it will  pay some  farms to 
participate  and others not.8 
If farms are ranked by th'ir  relative profits from  participating  and 
non—participating  and are indexed by the subscript  i, the distribution  of 
participant  and non—participant  farms is  desribed by the relative profit 
functions as represented by Figure  1.  changes  in program  parameters,  such 
w 
as  P  and X, will  shift  these relative  profit  functions,  changing the number 
T 
of  participant  farms.  This  emphasizes  the importance of capturing endogeneity 
of program  participation  in any modelling  of  the impacts of agricultural 
supports. 
The 1985 Farm  Bill  (which we do  not analyze here)  differs from  the 1981 
program  in several ways.  The 1985 Farm  Bill  attempts  to decouple production 
decisions  from target price  by fixing  established  yields at  historical 
values,  In this  way, producers  neither  gain nor lose  future deficiency 
payments  by  changing current yields.  Since the acrea&e base for wheat  is 
frozen new producers cannot  qualify  for the program benefits.  And while  in 
previous  programs,  land set—aside  had to be left fallow  or be  assi&ned  to sane 
other conservation use,  some  of  the set-aside acrea&e can now  be  planted  to 
other crops.9 6 
III  ANumericslGnglEuilibrinmModpjçaturinyje 
To  analyze the effects of  price  supports and set asides for wheat  in  the 
US, we use a numerical  general equilibrium  model  of global  trade in wheat 
which we have  used  elsewhere  (see Trela, Whalley  and Wigle  (1987)).  into  this 
model  we  embed  a richer treatment  of both  farm hehaviour  and  program supports 
in  the US,  We  first deaoribe  how  US  wheat  scoduction, program  supports, and 
set asides are treated in this new version of the model, and then briefly 
susmerize the rest of the model. 
V 
me United States wheat  sector is assured  to be made up  of  a nurber  of 
types  of  farms,  producing a distribution hoth of average yields,  and 
participating  and non'pertioipating farms  in the model.  As  an analytical 
convenience,  we  assume  that farms differ  only in the elasticity  of 
substitution between  land and non—land  inputs in  production.  We thus abstract 
from differences  in  lsnd quality across  farms,  location  <and thus 
transportation  costs in  shipping  crops), and differences  in comparative 
advantage  across  crop types between  farms. 
The production  technology  for each  farm  type,  i, is assumed to be 
constant returns,  and to take  the CES form, 
1  RR  r-  i  u-i  g  = B 
t 6  L  + (1 — 6)  Z  (2)  Li  ij 
where  gi is the output of farm  type i, L, and Z, are land and non—land  inputs,  1  1 
6 is a share parameter,  B a units  term  taken  to be  identical  across 
1 
all farms, and o  = — is the elasticity  of substitution between  inputs.  i  1cR 
1. Wheat—producing  land (L) and other  inputs  (Z)  are assumed to be the sole 
inputs in  the production of  wheat. 
Since  acreage available  to each  farm, L, is fixed, producers  face  a 
two—level optimization  problem.  They  must first compare their profit  under 
participation  in  the commodity  program  (including any set-aside provisions), 
to their profit  outside the program.  Given their participation  decision,  they 
then optimize  on  non-land  inputs and outputs. 
The profit  functions from  participation  and non—participation  are given 
by (3) and (4): 
p  w-  - 
=  P  y (l-X) L — P  Z  + T  (3) 
I  Ti  1  i  I 
N  W  - 
=  P  y  L  — P  (4) 
1  1  1  1 
where: 
N 




is the profit of farm  i, assuming  it does  participate  in  support 
1 
programs 
is the free (world) market  price for  wheat 
P  is the US  target price  for wheat 
T 
y ,  y  are the optimal yields  under  non—participation  and participation 
i  I 
decisions,  respectively 
L  Is the total acreage available  for farm  I 
1 
z.  .  P  is the price of other  lnputs 
Z ,  Z  are the total amounts of other inputs used  under  non—participant 
i  i 
and participant  decisions  respectively A is the proportional set—aside  requirement 
and  T,  ía the  lump  sum  paid  diversionn  received  by  farm i (equal to  the 
rental valueof a poe—specified proportion of  lend set aside when 
complying  with  set aside requirements). 
In this formulation  farm profits equal the  returns to land net of input 
costs,  Pertioipeting  farms are assumed to receoe the target price  for 
incremental  output, although  in some later evoeriments we very  the degree  to 
which deficiency  payments are coupled to current yields. 
Using  (2),  input demands for non—perticicetlng  farms are given by 
R 
1  —1 
(-fl——  )  2-1  2 
2  1  a 
P  (6—1) 
z  =  —  (  2(1-4)  —.——  )  + —  }  L  (5) 
1  8  Z  8 
end  their optimal yield is 
2 
1—P 
w  i  -  i  p  — 
y  = 8  (1-6)2 3  (S-)  L  (6) 
1  z 
P 




2  i  P 
p 
—  1  T  8—i  — 
z  1  —  (  2(1—8) —4  + —)  (1—k)  L  (7)  1  8  z  8 
p 
end  their  optimal  yield  is 
1-2 
w  i 
—  1  P  — 
y  =8!  (i—8)BJ-—.——(——)  (i—k)L  (8)  i  1-2  z  iP 
Given  the program  parameters  P  end A, end knowing  the market  price 
of wheat  2w, and the input price  pz,Tit  is poasible  to  solve for the 9 
optimal yields  and input demands under  participation  and non—participation. 
This allows  for a comparison of the two profit  functions  (3) and (4), and a 
determination  of the participation  decision.  This,  in  turn, allows  input 
demands and outputs  to be calculated. 
Whether  farms  choose to  participate  in  any configuration  of program 
supports and set asides  depen's on  the level of program  supports,  the way 
marginal  cost  functions  change as land is idled to comply  with  set asides, and 
the lump  sum costs that set aside  requirements cause.  We  assume that  the 
elasticity  of  substitution between  inputs across  farms  is  uniformly 
distributed over  a pre—specified  interval.  Farms with  higher  elasticities  of 
substitution have  higher  average yields, and, given that land is  a fixed 
factor for each  farm, these farms have  more  shallowly  sloped marginal  cost 
functions.  The parameter  values we use in the model  along  with  the data  to 
which  the model  is calibrated,  imply that  low elasticity  (high yield)  farms 
participate  in  program support, while high elasticity  farms do  not. 
The Remainder  of the Model 
As indicated above, this  treatment  of  the US wheat  sector has been 
introduced  into a  multi—country  general equilibrium  structure  of  the global 
grain market, used  by  Trela  et  al. (1987) to  analyze the effects of global 
policy  interventions  in  grains.  This  model uses the same ad valorem 
equivalent  approach  which  we criticize  here, and our modification  of  the 
earlier treatment  of  the US is aimed at  highlighting  the pitfalls of ad 
valorem modelling  that we  discuss  above.  Also, proceeding  in  this way allows 
comparisons  between the approach used  here, and a  more conventional  "price 
wedge" approach  to be made  for comparable  data. 
Thirteen  countries or  blocs10  of countries are identified  in  this 
earlier model, with  wheat  and other  goods as  the only  produced  consuodities. 
Demands in each  region are based  on  utility maximizing  behaviour with  a single 10 
national consumer assumed who receives  all the income originating  in  the 
country.  This  consumer  faces domestic  consumer pricea  in making 
consumption  decisions,  but the country as a  whole  satisfies  trade 
balance  at world prices,  i.e.: 
k=l  13  (9) 
where w  is the world price of wheat  denominatec  in terms of  other goods 
(whose price  is unity),  is  consumption  of wheat in  country k,  is 
c  p 
production  of wheat  in  country k, and X  and F  are country k's consumption 
and production  of  other goods. 
Production  in all regions  (all regions other then the US in  the present 
model)  is specified  through a constant  eiasticity  of  transformation  (OFT) 
function between wheat and  other  goods where  is the share perameter 
1 
p  p  p 
—  k  k  k 
F  = 1  6  g  + (1-6  )X  I  k=1 ,..,  13  (10)  k  kk  k  k 
in the CET function, end is the elasticity  along the transformation  surface. 
Distortions  in  the wheat sector  in these countries are  modelled  in ad valorem 
equivalent  form, typically  as ad valorem subsidies  which  produce a difference 
between producer  end consumer  prices  within the country. 
In  the present modified model,  a OFT function is used in the US to 
p  describe  the economy's production  possibilities  for other goods  (X  )  and 
US 
non—land  inputs into wheat  production  (ZUS). 
1 
—7pUS 
—  pUS  USI 
F  =16 I  +(l—6  )Z  I  (11)  us 
LUSUS 
us  Us j 11 
1 
where  6  is the share parameter  the  GET function,  and 
Us  US  p  —1 
Us 
is  the elasticity  alonS  the transportation  surface, as in  equation  (2).  The 
separate treatment  of  price  supports  and set asides  as modelled  above  also 
enters the  model. 
Equilibrium Solution  cf the Model 
The equilibrium  structure  of this extended model  involves three prices; 
those for  wheat,  other goods,  and non—land  inputs into  wheat production  in the 
US.  There  are three associated  market  excess demand  functions.  The first  two 
prices affect  behaviour  in  all regions  captured in the  model,  including the 
US, the third price only  affects behaviour  in the US  component  of  the model. 
In  regions other than the US, the relative price  of  wheat in  terms  of 
other goods,  along with  the ad valorem  domestic subsidies  or taxes allows 
production  and consumption of these  two goods to be calculated  using the first 
order conditions  for utility  and profit  maximizing  behaviour.  (nowing 
producer prices  in the country  (given by  world prices  gross of any distortions 
at  producer  level), a tangency  to  the production  frontier can  be found.  The 
country will  then  trade along a world price  line, such  that  a tangency of an 
indifference curve and a domestic  price  line is found  on  the world price  line 
through the production  point,  Solving for production  and consumption 
behaviour  in this  way implies the net trades for each  region  in wheat  and 
other goods. 
In the case  of the  US,  information on  the prices  of non—land inputs  into 
wheat and other goods  allows outputs of these two goods  in the  US to be 
determined  from  the first order  conditions  from  profit  maximization  subject to 
the  CET production  frontier.  The prices  of  wheat  and non—land  inputs also Tab I. 
t i  aS I  nd 
"'Trr'date  in value tarap) 
A.  Consrçtion, Production and  Trade  Oatal.  (All  values are  in 
$ bil  ions,) 
Production  Conson  u.S.A.  T3"  &0  6.9 
Canada  5,4  0.6  2.8 
Argyotirn  1,3  0.7  0.6 
Brazil  0.4  0.4  0,0 
01-her Marica  0.7  3.6  —2.9 
China  9.7  1.7  --2.0 
Japan  0_i  .0  —0.9 
Other Asia  2.6  13.4  —0,9 
EEC  0,7  8.3  2.4 
Other Europe  8  Oceania  4.4  8.6  —4,7 
Anstralin  2.4  0.6  .8 
U.S.S.R.  14.7  (6.9  —2.2 
Africa  -  1.5  2.9  -1,4 
bond  72.7  72.7 
1 
Production data is  (non F.  Production_YaarborA  (985,  (1979-81 
averages); Trade date  Is  (rue FAQ  World Trade Yearbook  1991, 
ticPrice54taCntric) 
Producer  Consunser 
Prices  Prices 
U.S.A.  164.02  64,0 
Canada  182,2  98.8 
Arpentina  93.9  1547.8 
Brazil  319.0  92,8 
Other Parer ica  220.4  202,5 
4  4 
China  16-4.0  64,0 
Japan  979.0  395.4 
Other Asia  235.5  I51.i 
S  5 
EEC  168.5  68.5 
Other Europe  &  Oceania  164.06  16406 
Australia  152.0  154.0 
U.S.S.R.  123.0  125,0 
Africa  227.8  227.8 
Unlees  otherwise noted.  the source for this price data Is LattlnareC982). 
Producers price for non  progres participants. 
Pros CIrlo (1986). 
4 
No  data (set to "aueld"  price). 
5EC  Intervention  price.  Sources  Agricultural Situation in the  Cannwnit-y  (1981) 
and  Yaarbonk  of Agricultural  Statistics  (1981), both  published by Eurontet. 
6 
Data  used  for New  Zeal and. 
7 
Producers'  price date used. 
8Anrsr of date for Kaoye,  Egypt, Norooro, South Africa, and Nirrla. 13 
allow for solution of program participation decisions for all the farm types 
in  the model, using  equations  (3) — (8).  This  allows  both the use of  non-land 
inputs,  and the returns to land for all farm  types to be calculated.  Enowing 
the value  of production  of other goods and non-land  inputs, and the return  to 
land  for all farm  types, allows  aggregate  income  and hence  US demands  for 
other  goods  and wheat,  to be etermined. 
Aggregating  across  the US and all the other  countries  or regions in the 
node!  yields  the market  demands  for  wheat  and other goods.  Summing  production 
across  all countries  yields  total  supply, and hence  excess  demand  for wheat 
and other  goods.  The third  excess  demand  is given  by the difference  between 
the demand  for non—land  inputs  into wheat  summed  across  all farm  types, and 
output of Z 
from  the tangency  to  the CET production  frontier  in the US. 
The model  thus  generates  a system  of three excess  demands  involving 
three prices.  Equilibrium  occurs  in the model when a zero is found for all 
three excess  demands.  The model is solved  using  a  modified  Newton  method,  for 
which  the experience  has been that convergence  is  rapid. 
IY.  Data,  Model Calibration,  and Elasticities 
We use the model  for counterfactual  equilibrium  analysis,  by calibrating 
the  model to a 1981  microconsistent  equilibrium  data  set,  and then computing 
counterfactual  equilibria  for a variety  of policy  changes.  The global 
component  of the  model  has been  calibrated  to the 1981 data set using  the 
inverse function  method  outlined  in Mansur  and Whalley  (1984).  This  involves 
solving  for values of share  and scale parameters  in  the CES and CET functions 
so as to produce  data  on quantities  demanded and produced  as solutions  to 
optimising  behaviour  at 1981 equilibrium  prices. 14 
Prior  to implementing these procedures, values of substitution 
elasticities in  the 985 and CET functions  need to be specified.  We use 
estimates  reported  by Valdes  and Zeits  (1985) for supply  and demand  elasticity 
estimates  for wheat  by country,  and values  of the elasticities  of substitution 
are chosen  to reproduce  these, 
The main features  of the micr000nsiatent  data  used in this  calibration 
procedure  are displayed  in Table  1.  Th.ey eo  the large net expcrt  position 
of the US in wheat in 1981, along  with  the significant  wheat  export  position 
of the EEC.  Price  data  reveal  the significant  affects  cf domes-tic  policy 
interventions  by region, especially  in  Japan.  US  producer  prices era thoce 
paid to non—participants,  rather  than target pricas. 
To use  the  inverse function  calibration method  to determine  parameters 
for the wheat  production  functions  for the US component  of the model it would 
be necessary  to know  acreage,  input use, yielda,  and the elasticity  of 
substitution  between  inputs  for ferns  of  all types.  There  is no linked  date 
of this form  available. 
We therefore  iteratively  search across  combinations  of the wheat 
production  function  parameters,  6, 8, and the mean value  of  8. until the 
following  three conditions  are met: 
(i)  The US produotion  of wheat  from  farm  optimising  behaviour  equals 
the value  of production  in the micr000nsistent  data  set. 
(ii)  Non—land  inputs used in the  production  of wheat  as a result  of 
optimising  behaviour  equal  the value  of inputs  appearing  in the 
microconsistent  data set. 
(iii)  The endogenously  detennined  participation  rate aquaia  the observed 
1981  rate of 42  percent. 15 
We thus determine  values  of these parameters  such  that  optimising 
behaviour  by  farmers is consistent  with the observed  data. 
We then  assume  that the substitution  elasticities  across  fames, R  are 
spread over  an internal  wzth  a stepaize  somewhat  at CMoS,  This distribution 
of RI  leads  to a mean supply elssicity of wheat  of  0.18,  in line with 
consensus  estimates  used eiaewhere<11  Thos 0.065  step—size  can then be  saried 
in subsequent  sensiti.'ty  analysis  These diffarances  in  ssbccztution 
parameters  across farms  allow  an endogenouc  participatIon  rats ro ha 
determined  which matches the  observed salue  of  22 per...ert, 
Table  2  reports both some of the ther data we use in implementing thee 
procedures, along with the subati utsnn  aiaas  icitiea  by  farm  class and implied 
own price esasticsties of wheat supply  by  srm  type  The data on program 
characteristics are presented largely  to provide an indication of tne 
differences  tetween nsrket prices, loan ratea  and  target prices  and in a 
footnote wa  indicate  now  these base  changed  in rerent  years.  The sef—saida 
rate,  X,  used  in  the model  is the  1981 value of  15  peLcent. 
An  issue  of  some  controversy  In the agricultural econonica litarature2 
has been the degree  of 'slippage" in  cormuodity  programs,  and it ia worth 
indicating how this was handled in the data and the model.  Slippage  indicates 
the extent  to  which  a  1  percent acreage  reduction  in the program due,  say,  to 
participation in set asides, leads to  a smaller than 1 percent reduction  in 
both  planting  and yields.  Slippage  reflects the response  of farmers to a 
number  of substitution  margins in  response to set aside  requirements.  These 
include more intensive  use of remaining  land,  setting aside  the least 
productive  of the land  they have  available  for cuitivation,  end planting  all 
land  and then  subsequently  plowing  under  the least productive 16 
Table 2 
Data  on the U.S. Wheat Sector Used in Calibrating  the Model 
A. Production  Data 
1. Wheat Progranne  Acreage  90.6 Million  Acres1 
2, Value of non—land  inputs 
into  wheat  production  $6.84  Billion2 
3. 1981  participation  rate  42% 
4.  Farm  Types  Elasticity  of  Own Price  Elasticities 
Substitution  of Wheat Supply  by 
Ri  Farm Type 
0  0.31  0.45 
1  0.38  0.60 
2  0.44  0.78 
3  0.50  1.02 
4  0.57  1.32 
B.  1981 Program Support Levels3 
(Prices are $US per bushel,) 
Target  price  3.81 
Market  price  3.66 
Loan  rate  3.20 
Paid  diversion  5% 
Set-aside  requirement  15% 
1Glaser  (1986) p. 85. 
Estimate based  on  U.S.D.A.  information  for Illinois. 
3Coyle  et. al., p.  16. 
4Comparable  data  for 1986 are $4.38  for the target  price,  $3.30 
for the  market  price,  and $2.40 for the loan rate, showing  the 
large increase  in  prograimne  supports  occurring  through  the 1980s. 17 
once  the realized  yields  on the various parcels  of land  is  known.  The 
"slippage"  from  farms altering  their  input use in response  to land being idled 
as a result  of set asides  is captured  in  the model,  but these other  effects 
are not.  To  the extent that increased  cuitijacion  of non-ioied  iano  is the 
largest source  of slippage,  making  no  special modifications  to the mcdal  to 
take account  of these  other  factors seems  to us a reasonabie  way to 
proceed 
V  -  Qprin Ad  Web  rem  and  f  Pro  rem Mo4eiiiug of US  Wheat  Market 
Intervention 
In this  secticn,  we report  results  from  the model on the effects  whach 
wouid  follow  from  elimination  of boch  US  price  supports  end set—mside 
requirements  for wheat  using  1981 data  We contrast  the results from  our 
model when programs  are represented  in  'full  form'  ,  that  is incorporating  the 
endogenously  determined  participation  de'ision  as set out in  the preceding 
section,  with  those  produced  by a comparable  rrodel  in which their effects are 
modelled  in ad vaiorem equivalent  form.  The differences  between both 
production  and weif  are effects  of  eliminating  program  supports  and et  asides 
are large, emphasizing  ti-ia point  we make in the introduction  to our paper, 
that  ad valorem  equivalent  modelling  of the effects  of these programs  can be 
highly  misleading.  We also  explore  the sensitivity  of  model  resuico  to 
elasticity  values  and other  parameters. 
Secsuse  of the sharp escalation  of program  supports  in recent  years, we 
have chosen  to dramatize  our model  results by using  the escimates  of ad 
valorem  equivalent  for wheat  support programs  represented  as the producer 
subsidy  equivalent  (P5K), reported  in recent  USDA  publication  (1987) rather 
than  the actual  levels  of program  supports  for 1981 in our  nicroconsistent 18 
equilibrium  data set.  The PSE for  wheat  is defined  by the USDA  as "the 
revenue required  to compensate  producers  if existing  government  programs  were 
eliminated",  which  the USDA estimates  for wheat  to be in the range of 0.25 to 
0.49 (ibid. p. 29).  This  PSE estimate  thus  suggests  that the value  of US 
programs  to  producers  is between  one—quarter and one—half  of the gross 
domestic value  of  production.  This includes deficiency  payments,  paid 
diversion  and the commodity  loans program. 
We have  used the minimum  of this  USDA  range  in  modelling  the effects  of 
US intervention  in  the wheat  market,  first  treating  these commodity  programs 
as  equivalent  to an ad valorem  producer  subsidy.  When modelled  in this way, 
these programs  have  am unambiguously  positive  effect  on  production,  even 
though  our earlier  discussion  suggests  the net effect  of commodity  programs  is 
ambiguous.  This is because  of the offsetting  effects of set—aside 
requirements,  and production  incentives  associated  with  program  benefits. 
With the programs  modelled  explicitly, as in earlier  sections,  the 
results could  hardly  be more different.  This is shown  in Table  3.  When 
modelled  as ad valorem  subsidies,  eliminating  the programs  causes US output  to 
fall and the world  price to  rise.  When  the  policies  are explicitly  modelled 
to capture  changing participation  decisions  and acreage  set asides, the 
opposite  result  occurs.  Our estimated  PSE is low, and increasing  it to the 
middle  of the range suggested  by the USDA5  calculations  would  only serve to 
increase  the disparity  in results  between  the two approaches. 
Under  explicit  program  modelling,  output  rises  when  programs  are 
abolished  because  the increase  in  production  from  the extra acreage  planted 
more than  offsets  the fall in production  due to the decrease  in  prices 
received by producers  originally  in  the program.  In the ad valorem  subsidy Table 3 
Effects  on  Prod  uction  and Welfare from Elimination of U.S. 
Price Suorts  and Set Asides for Wheat 
When U.S.  Intervention is Mod  elled As: 
(1)  (2) 
Producer  Subsidy  Full CoQ4jt  Pro rem  E'l  withPflaSuortsemd 
Set Asides 
%  Wheat Production 
inUS,  1O3 
%  World Price  +9.1%  —1.11 
%  Rental Value of 
Land Used for Wheat 
Production  N/A 
%  Change in (J.S.  Welfare  4.5%  1.4% 
as a %  of the Value of 
Wheat Production 
%  Change  in Production in Other .ountries: 
Canada  2.4  —0.3 
Argentina  1.8  —0.2 
Brazil  1.8  —0.2 
Other America  1.8  —0.2 
China  0.0  0.0 
Japan  0.0  0.0 
Other Asia  2.0  —0,2 
EEC  0,0  0,0 
Other Europe &  Oceania  1.8  —0.2 
Australia  3.9  —0.5 
USSR  0.0  0.0 
Africa  0.0  0.0 
World  —0.8  0.1 
* Welf  ate is measured  as the Hicksian EV in millions  of $US 
(1980) and calculated as a proportion  of the original  value of 
production  at world prices. 20 
case, the output  of the US wheat  sector  must fall when the subsidy is 
eliminated  so long as the world  price does  not rise  by more than  the subsidy. 
Other  implications  follow  from the results.  when support programs  are 
explicitly  modelled,  budget  expenditures  of over  one  quarter  billion have a 
remarkably  small  impact on land rents.  This is because  the idled resources 
implied by acreage set—asides act as lump  sum  taxes on program  participants. 
Budget  expenditures  of $264  million are initially associated with annual land 
rents of $4,281 million,  Elimination  of program  supports  reduces program 
costs to zero but only  reduces  annualized  returns to land by *75 million,  or 
less than  2  percent 
Also,  the effects of program  elimination  are different  across  farms. 
Farms that were  previously  participating  experience  a loss  of program 
benefits,  plus a decrease  in world  price.  Farms who were  not initially 
participating  only  experience  the effects of the lower world  price.  Land 
values  thus  fall  by 3.3  percent  for the most—likely—to—participate  class  of 
farms,  but by only 1.1 percent  for the least—likely—to—participate. 
Furthermore,  the elimination  of set—asides  and  paid  diversion  generates 
a sizeable  welfare gain for the US, and the world  as a whole.  The world 
welfare  gain ($245 million>  corresponds  almost precisely  to the value  of the 
land  originally  idled under  the set—aside program  ($253 million).  Results  in 
Table 3 suggest  that while  adverse terms of trade effects  from  abolition  of US 
programs  do  occur, they  are not large enough  to offset  the welfare  gains 
associated with eliminating the waste of  domestic resources. 
In all numerical  modelling,  the implied effects of policy  changes depend 
on both  the structure  of and the underlying  parameter  values  used in the 
model.  In the  present  case, we can  be reasonably  sure  that  the qualitative 21 
effects  on output and  welfare  from. removing program  supports when  modelled  as 
ad valorem  subsidy  form  will not be sensitive  to  model  specification. 
However,  the qualitative  effects when  programs  are explicitly  modelled do 
depend  or.  the parameter  specification,  since  the output  response will  depend 
on both the elasticities  of substitution  between  Land and other  inputs, and 
the elasticity  of transformation  between  agricultural  nputs  end 
non—sgrlouitursl  goods 
Some sensitivity  snsiyses  of the reLlts  reported  in  Table  3 are 
presented  in  Table 4.  Results under  ad vsloram equIvalent  treatment  are not 
that  sensitive  to model  respeciflcstion.  AlL of the signs  of rhanges  in 
response  to program  elimination  are preserved  Perhaps  somewhat surislngly, 
when  programs  are explicitly  modelled  results are also  not qualitatively 
changed  by using  these alternative  re-specifications  of the modal. 
This seems  to give  more support  to the hypothesis  that, at 
least In the pre-1985  period,  the set-aside  features of commodity 
programs  in the US more than  offset  production  incentives 
associated  with increases  in target prices. 
Vt,  Summary  and Conclusions 
This  paper  stresses  the  pitfalls  involved  in  modelling  domestic 
agricultural  support programs  in ad vaiorem  equivalent  form,  illustrating  how 
in the use of US  commodity  programs  for wheat, payments  to  producers  who 
participate  in programs  are linked to non—marginal  reductions  in  total  acreage 
planted.  High support prices  which  might  appear  to  subsidize production  can 
thus  also increase participation  in  support programs  cutting  acreage planted, 
and potentially  reducing  output.  Ad valorem  modelling  will  miss  these  effects. Table  a 
Sensitivity  of Results  on the  Offents of  03 Presents Suspects for Whet to Model Parameter, 
Oonoi.ttotty  of Results  to  endsl.  opnntftoatton  When 00 Intervention  Modelled in Ed  'faloree  EQuiValent 
central  "High"  Oapplf1  "Low" lapplj1  "HIgh'  demand1  "Low"  denan,4 
toss  Elaettottiss  glootiottiss  .flA,jsite  Elaetioitiae 
—10.3  —17.8  —6.0  —11.7  —9.2 
t  I 0.0. Welfare 
Relative to Wheat 
Pro  duot  I  On  6.1  7,7  1.0  1.0  7.3 
"Rtt"  and "Low" sean that the  specified  elaetioitiee of  substitution  is produotios 
and  denaod  are lrespestioslyl  doobled, aod  halved in  all oountniss, 
Ianoititltf  of  Results to Elastiolty  Specification  when 05  Pronraee,e  connects  are 000lioitlr 
Rods  lIed 
t  0 0.2.  Welfare 
Relative  to  Wheat 
Ptoduotion  1.4  1.4 
7, 1 Rectal  Oalaa 
of Land  —1.4  —1.2  1.8  —1.2  —1.4  1.3 
1.2  1.1 
—1,7  —1.1  —2.1 
°"High"  and  'Law"  elasticity  oonfiguretione  involve  all  specified  slesttuitiee  being  act  equal to  twine and  one—half 
(reupnotivslyl  of the  central  case eetinete  used is all  oosstriee,  jn the  ease of the  03 slaetinitf  of tranafor,nation,  there  Is 55  sorteeponding  elasticity  in other  regions in the  esdel,  linac  the distribution  of farms  is speolfled  by 
the naaes  lasilcity  of substitution  between land  and ether  inputs,  and the  aeeoniated  range, these  oonfigarationn  tan 
be oojsesarieed in terms  of the  implied supply  elaetiuitiae  for  wheat, 
Wheat Supply  Elaetinttiee 
Mean  einiamae  Meeiwa 
Law  OWl  0.22  0.83 
Cantral  case  0.78  0.83  1.32 
High  1,14  3.70  1.87 
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5. 1  0.0. 
Prodootion 
5. 1 World 
P  roduntion 
1. 1 World 
—0.8 
49,1 
—0.9  —0.6  —1.2  —0.1 
+10.1  +7.0  +6.0  +10.4 
oopp1y Elasticities  is all regions 
Central  other  than the US 
1  1 
Case  High  Low 
1.3  l.a  1.2 
5.  t  0.1. 
Ptvdootivn 
5.  I World 
Production 
5.  1  World 
lesand  Elaetinitiee 
in  all regions 
Rich  Low 
1.3  1.2 
0.1  0.1  0,1  0.2 
Elastioity of  Tranefornatios 
between  non—land inputs  & 
other goode  in tha US 
Rich  Low 
1.0  1.6 
Elastitity of 
Iubctct+tioo  in 
fern  prndaotion 
in the  OS 
lUsh  Low 
1.2  l.W 
0.1  0.1 
—1.1  —0.8  —1.7  —0.8  —1.3  —0,0 
1.2  1.8  1.2  1,6 
0.1  0.1  0.1 
—l,W  —1.0  —1.2 23 
A numerical  general equilibrium  model  built and calibrated  to 1981 lata 
suggests  that, when  tully modelled,  US commodity  program can have  a positive 
effect  on produce  incomes, and a negative  effect  on totel production,  which 
ia oppostte  to the effects which  would be  portrayed  by ad  valorem equivalent 
models  The model  also serves to  highlight  the (perhaps obvious) wasterulneas 
of oormodity programs  which  involve uneoployment of productive  resources 
(acreage set--asides) as a pre tonditon fur income  support,  Thia is reflected 
in the relatively small reduction  n  lano rents brought  about by aoolioon of 
commodity programs  in the model  "imulationa, 
Similar features  occur in  oo'rdtodoty erograme  in other countries,  as 
the Japanese rice  support program, and so the use  or  ad valorem equivalent 
measures of the effects of agrcuitural  programs obviously needs to be more 
widely questioned.  This same point also carriea  over into the currant 
international  trade negotiations  in the Uruguay Round where much of the 
technical  work is focused on the conatruotion  o5 ad vaiorem—lika measures 
(producer  subsidy equivalents,  or  PSEs)  as negotiable  instruments. 24 
ENDNOTES 
1.  See, for example, Chishoim  and  Tyers  (1985), Valdes  and Zeitz  (1980), and 
Frohberg at  al. (1987). 
2.  We  concentrate  on pre—1985  programs,  because of  changes  in support 
programs  in  the 1985 Farm Bill.  These  weakened  but, as we discuss  below, 
by no means  removed  the features we stress here. 
3.  These  include the 'acreage quotas' used  by the Canadian  Wheat  Board  to 
limit grain deliveries  to  wheat pools.  One can argue that  the major 
constraint  on  grain production  is the transportation  system, and these 
quotas merely  ration  access  to shipment facilities.  Price supports  to 
dairy  farmers in  the EEC have,  since 1984, been  accompanied  by  quotas. 
Again  ad  valorem equivalent  modelling  of the price support  component 
alone will  be  misleading.  Also, rice  producers  in Japan  must  comply  with 
acreage  diversion  requirements  in order to qualify  for high  Support 
prices  paid  by the government  (see Yasuo  (1987) and Naraomi and Takamitsu 
(1987).  Another complex  situation  is the differential  exchange  rate 
facing farm  exporters  in Argentina  (see the description  in Clrio 
(1987)). 
4.  See the exposition  of applied  general equilibrium modelling  techniques  in 
Shoven  and Whalley  (1988). 
5.  This is a government—owned  and operated corporation  established  in 1933 
to stabilize and support  farm incomes and prices. 
6,  Farmers  also receive diversion  payments to cover  part of the foregone 
earnings  on  idled  land.  These  apply to  required diversions  and to 
voluntary  (extra) acreage diverted  to approved conservation  uses.  The 
sum of  deficiency  and diversion payments  is capped  at  $50,000 per farm 
under the wheat and feed  grain programs  combined,  although  this is rarely 
a  binding  constraint  for wheat  producers  since until  recently  there were 
no restrictions  on subdividing  acreage  covered by  the programs. 25 
7.  in  periods when  price  supports  (and  loan rates)  have been  high,  such  as 
in the late  1970s,  a sharp growth in stockpiles  of wheat  and feed grains 
has occurred.  Further policies  beyond  acreage reductions  have then been 
used for stockpile management.  One such prograssne  was the 
PeymentIn-Xind (fIX) progrszmse introduced  in  1983.  Under  this 
progreasse,  fansers who agreed  to reduce  their  acreage by  between  10  end 
30 percent  more  then  the amount  required  to be  eligible for loans, 
purchases,  and payments  were compensated by the government,  in—kind,  i.e. 
by  peyment  of oormsodities  out of its own cossoodity reserves. 
8.  Also,  the more that yields very across  the lend on any indivduai fans, 
the more attractive  is the program,  since  the lowest yield  land oem be 
Jiverted  from  production. 
9.  subject  to limitations  that aim to avoid gluts. 
10.  The assumption  thst only S.  (or equivalently  o;  isries by fans  ciasa 
also generates  a distribution  of yields  across fans. 
11.  To simplify  the calculations  we make  with the model, we calculate 
solutions  to fans optimization  problems  for five eisstioity  values,  and 
interpolate  over  a range  of elasticities  of substitution between  land  and 
other inputs. 
12.  United  States, China,  Australia,  Canada, Japan,  USSR, Argentina,  Other 
Asia,  Africa,  Brazil, EEC, Other  America, Other  Europe  & Oceania. 
13.  Valdes  and Zeitz estimate  is  0.80. 
14.  See Carat  and Miller  (1985) for example. 26 
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